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Abstract I start by reconsidering two familiar arguments against modal re-
alism. The argument from epistemology relates to the issue whether we can
infer the existence of concrete objects by a priori means. The argument from
pragmatics purports to refute the analogy between the indispensability of
possible worlds and the indispensability of unobserved entities in physical
science and of numbers in mathematics. Then I present two novel objections.
One focusses on the obscurity of the notion of isolation required by modal
realism. The other stresses the arbitrary nature of the rules governing the
behaviour of Lewisean universes. All four objections attack the reductive
analysis of modality that is supposed to be the chief merit of modal realism.
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1
In this paper I want to explore the difficulties posed by the reduction of modal
notions for Lewis’ metaphysics of possible worlds. The idea of Lewis’ worlds is
a familiar one. The actual world is identified with our spatiotemporal universe.
There are other universes spatiotemporally disconnected from ours. These
universes are merely possible worlds. The universes satisfy the requirement
of maximality: every spatiotemporal part of a given world is connected to its
every other part and no part of the world is disconnected from any other part.
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Thus, to say that X is merely possible is to say that it is located in another
universe, and to say that X is actual is to say that it is located in our universe. A
complication arises with necessarily existing entities, such as sets, which are not
spatiotemporal. It is resolved by further distinguishing between three different
senses of ‘being in a world’.1 Another complication is with the existence of
spirits. Lewis wishes to allow the worlds containing spirits—perhaps in contrast
to the actual world. Those spirits have to be at least temporal. For if not, there
would not be any reason to assign a spirit X to the world w rather than to
the world u = w. On the other hand, it is clear that they are contingent and
are, therefore, nothing like sets which are represented at every world. Some
theorists, however, regard the claim about spirits as simply incoherent.2
The chief ambition and merit of modal realism, as contrasted with other
versions of realism about possible worlds, is its reduction of modal notions.
The success of the reduction entails that for any statement S1 involving modal
locutions there is a statement S2 where modal locutions are replaced by
possible-worlds locutions, and for every statement S2 there is a statement S3
where possible-worlds locutions are replaced by spacetime locutions, where
the content of S1 is given by the content of S2, and the content of S2 is given by
the content of S3. Thus, for example, let S1 be ‘Grass could possibly be blue.’
Then S2 is ‘There is a possible world w such that grass is blue in w’, and S3
is ‘There is a spatiotemporally isolated (spatiotemporal) universe w such that
grass is blue in w.’ In the outcome we dispense with the modal vocabulary.
All that is required for adequately expressing modal locutions is the spacetime
vocabulary. The clauses for necessity and contingency may therefore be put as
follows:
S is necessarily true iff S is true in every spatiotemporal universe.
S is contingently true iff S is true in our spatiotemporal universe and there
is a spatiotemporal universe disconnected from ours where S is false.
I will argue that the reduction of modality turns out to be the source of several
difficult objections to the metaphysics of modal realism. The plan is as follows.
In Sections 2 and 3 I elaborate the details of two familiar arguments question-
ing the epistemology and pragmatic virtues of Lewis’ theory. These arguments
exploit modal reduction, but none of them is quite decisive. In Sections 4 and
5 I ask whether Lewis provided us with an adequate understanding of intra-
world spatiotemporal connectedness and cross-world isolation. I argue that,
although there may be an acceptable coherent notion of the former, there can
be no notion of the latter acceptable to the modal realist. In Section 6 I argue
that precisely because of modal reduction the plurality of worlds is necessarily
governed by a physical law. Finally, in Section 7 I address modifications of
modal realism intended to deal with some of the difficulties raised earlier.
1See Lewis (1986:94–6).
2See Lewis (1986:2,73) and Bigelow and Pargetter (1987:106–7).
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2
Speaking generally, given a certain philosophical doctrine, two classes of
objections may be distinguished. They may be labelled ‘formal’ and ‘philo-
sophical’, respectively. Formal objections aim at uncovering a contradiction
within the doctrine. Thus, Russell’s paradox constituted such an objection to
Frege’s programme in Grundgesetze, Gödel’s First theorem generated a formal
objection to Hilbert’s programme, whilst Simmel formally refuted Nietzsche’s
theory of eternal return. In contrast, Poincaré’s misgivings about logicism
and formalism belong squarely in the class of philosophical objections. Those
objections, far more numerous than the objections of the first sort, question
the doctrine’s plausibility and the soundness of its arguments, leaving aside the
issue of its coherence. The essence of the objections belonging to the second
class is summarised by Russell who initially regarded Leibniz’ Monadology as
‘a fantastic fairy tale, coherent perhaps, but wholly arbitrary.’3
The debate in the metaphysics of possible worlds produced at least one
notable formal objection, the Kaplan-Peacocke paradox, and recently there
were attempts to find others. The objections I consider here are all of the
philosophical sort. One familiar argument against modal realism raises epis-
temological concerns. The guiding thought is that we cannot have any a
priori information about the existence of material bodies.4 There must be
something amiss in the modal realist ambition to discover isolated universes
in the solitude of his study. Another form of the same objection will focus
on causality. If a subject knows that X exists, then he must stand in a causal
relation to X.
The modal realist is aware of this kind of objection.5 His response is
essentially that the necessary existence of possible worlds is known a priori,
whereas the contingent existence of material objects is known empirically.
More specifically, consider a material object X. The modal realist reply to the
objection from a priori knowledge can be summarised as follows:
If X is merely possible, then the facts about X are
knowable (if at all) a priori. If X is actual, then the (1)
facts about X are knowable (if at all) empirically.
And to the objection from causal knowledge he replies thus:
If X is merely possible, then the facts about X are not
known causally. Only if X is actual the facts about X (2)
are known causally (if the causal theory of knowledge is
correct).
3See Russell (1937:xvii).
4See e.g. Stalnaker (1996).
5See Lewis (1986:112).
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The common trend is clear: we should not expect merely possible physical
entities to be known in the same way as actual ones.
However, such a response does not cohere with the modal realist’s own
view. It is convincing only in so far as we believe in the irreducible properties
of necessity and actuality which have an impact on our mode of knowing. But
according to modal realism, to be merely possible is nothing but to be spa-
tiotemporally disconnected from our universe (in the special case of beings like
spirits, to be temporally disconnected). So the conditionals in (2) are question-
begging: of course, one cannot causally know facts about spatiotemporally
isolated objects. Yet, the original worry was whether anything is, therefore,
knowable about these objects. Similarly, the conditionals (1) can work if we
make the same assumption: that actual material objects and merely possible
material objects are known in two different ways. Given that mere possibility
is entirely a matter of spatiotemporal isolation, we are still puzzled as to why
there must be odd material objects necessarily knowable a priori (if knowable
at all).
The modal realist response may also be interpreted as drawing a contrast
between knowing necessary truths and knowing contingent truths. It is the
knowledge of contingent truths that is empirical and which, among other
things, may require perception. But the knowledge of necessary may well be a
priori or perhaps based on considerations of utility. Such a response overlooks
the issue of the ontological debate. The issue at stake is the nature of possible
worlds. Firstly, both the modal realist and the objector could certainly agree,
for instance, on the form of logical knowledge or mathematical knowledge—
that is, on the form of knowledge of logical space. Their agreement will result
from independent assumptions about logic or mathematics. But the attempt
to put the distinction between knowledge of necessities and knowledge of
contingencies at the top and derive from it conclusions about logical or
mathematical knowledge should fail. The reason is the same: the modal realist
analyses necessary truths as truths in all spatiotemporally isolated universes.
And then it seems inexplicable how knowledge about those universes is
safeguarded. Secondly, the sides can agree on the existence of certain entities
called ‘possible worlds’ that are indispensable for the modal discourse. What
the sides cannot agree on is why possible worlds are to be regarded as
spatiotemporal universes. On the lips of the epistemic objector this turns into
a doubt about discovering the spatiotemporal nature of possible worlds in the
solitude of one’s study.
The epistemic objector is, therefore, not committed to denying the existence
of modal realist universes. Rather, if these universes exist, then the modal
realist account of establishing their existence cannot be right—due precisely
to their spatiotemporal nature. Now, it may be noted that epistemological
difficulties plague a view which treats possible worlds as abstract objects.
Supposing that epistemic access to abstract objects is no less problematic than
such access to isolated spacetimes, modal realism apparently would fare no
worse than its rivals in the realist camp. Moreover, one could add, if one gives
up on realism altogether and converts to nominalism, epistemology might still
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be a problem. As long as we are prepared to grant truth-aptness to modal
discourse, we remain unclear about the mechanism of our modal knowledge.
Even if we banish suspect entities, our reasoning on what could or could not be
will rest on flimsy foundations. So, one could conclude with McGinn, there is
no special epistemological problem with modal realism. All these problematic
truths we are alleged to know a priori, and that is where the trouble is: a far
more general mystery of a priori knowledge.6
But we may readily admit the difficulty of providing adequate modal episte-
mology, and still insist on the epistemological objection. With modal realism,
the unique difficulty is in the perceived disharmony between the object and our
professed means to gather information about the object. If, for instance, you
were told of someone who can smell numbers, you are likely to refuse to take
the statement literally. Numbers, if they exist, are not the kind of thing to be
smelled. Nor are victories, propositions, or universities. And similarly, it seems
mildly absurd to employ modal reasoning in discoveries of spatiotemporally
isolated objects. Assuming that Lewisian universes exist, modal reasoning is
not the appropriate medium of our epistemic access to them.
So the problem posed by the epistemic objector is not in merely pointing
out the absence of a coherent epistemic account. If it were such, modal
realism would perhaps have challenges analogous to those encountered by
ersatzisms or Forbes’ modalism. Rather, the objection runs, facts about those
universes cannot be discovered in the course of a reflection over a theory
of modal statements. The situation is different with ersatzist worlds. These
entities are adapted precisely for the task of explaining truth conditions of
modal statements. They are not alien to modality, since modality has not been
eliminated from their conception. It is then only too natural to expect that we
know facts about them through modal reflection. And an ersatzist may further
attempt to refuse providing a substantive epistemic account. Since ersatzist
entities are introduced as tools of modal semantics, everything that is to be
known about them is necessarily known by the same mechanism we employ to
know modal truths. There would, therefore, be no problem above and beyond
the problem of counterfactual reasoning.7
The contrast drawn by the epistemic objector is, therefore, this. With modal
ersatzisms, knowledge of possible worlds may be a mystery, at least so far
as modal knowledge generally is a mystery. A modal ersatzist view leaves a
lacuna. With modal realism, knowledge of possible worlds (qua spatiotemporal
universes) cannot be generated by the analysis of modal statements, however
complex the details of the epistemic mechanism are. A modal realist leaves us,
not with a mystery, but with false epistemology.
6See McGinn (1981).
7This move is made by neo-Fregeans in the debate over mathematical platonism. See Hale and
Wright (2001:321).
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3
The second promising objection relates to pragmatic considerations.8 Here
the guiding thought is that there is no parallel between believing in Lewisean
universes and believing in electrons or numbers. The objection is apt, because
one of the main arguments provided by Lewis in favour of modal realism—
according to some, the main argument—appears to be a pragmatic one:
Why believe in a plurality of worlds?—Because the hypothesis is service-
able, and that is the reason to think that it is true. . . . Modal realism
is fruitful; that gives us good reason to believe that it is true. Lewis
(1986:3–4)
The full version of the argument could be put as follows:
1. Modal statements occur in many truth-apt areas of discourse.
2. Therefore, some modal statements are true.
3. But the best analysis of modal statements is given by quantifying over
possible worlds.
4. Such quantification is best understood when the worlds are spatiotemporal
universes.
5. Therefore, the worlds are spatiotemporal universes.
6. Therefore, since there are worlds, there are universes spatiotemporally
isolated from our universe.
One problem here is the transition from pragmatic reasons to ontological
claims.9 How can anything like simplicity or fruitfulness be used to establish
the existence of any particular entity? Although many times theories taken
to be true also exhibit pragmatic virtues, there is generally no guarantee that
every true theory is pragmatically advantageous. Nor is there any guarantee
that every pragmatically good theory is true. The problem might disappear if
the concept of truth itself is given a pragmatic treatment, but that is not part of
Lewis’ proposal. It better not be, since the next step would be to make reality
a pragmatic affair as well, which would make his position anything but realism.
However, the modal realist might try to appeal to the analogy with mathe-
matics. The argument above should be compared to the superficially analogous
indispensability argument in mathematics:
1. Mathematical statements occur in the best physical theory.
2. The best physical theory is true (or: we should believe it to be true,
notwithstanding the chance it will be refuted in the future; let us disregard
this qualification in what follows).
3. Therefore, some mathematical statements are true.
8Hinted in Skyrms (1976:326).
9This point is forcefully made by Bueno and Shalkowski (2000).
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4. But some true mathematical statements contain quantification over
numbers.
5. Therefore, numbers exist.
The mathematical argument is not revolting: no-one gives a mathematical
realist a ‘blank stare’.10 The reason is that the truth of physical theories seem to
us a fair price to pay for the existence of abstract objects, even if their existence
can be denied on different grounds. Secondly, we believe that mathematics
does not go beyond the area of its jurisdiction in asserting the existence of
numbers. In contrast to modal realism, it does not even tell us what sort of
entities numbers are. Suppose, per impossible, that one of the implications
of the truth of a mathematical statement S were the statement ‘The death
penalty should be abolished’. We would then feel that there is something
wrong either with S, or with our inference from S to the statement about the
death penalty. This is because mathematics cannot intervene in the moral and
political discourse.
By the same token, the correct analysis of modal notions seems to be an
insufficient price to pay for the existence of isolated universes. And this feeling,
we conjecture, is a result of our belief that the analysis of modal statements
cannot establish the existence of even one material object any more than it can
establish some fact of Roman history.
We could also compare the modal realist argument with a purely physicalist
indispensability argument:
1. The best physical theory contains quantification over electrons.
2. The best physical theory is true (with the same qualification as above).
3. Therefore, electrons exist.
When a physical theory commits us to the belief in the existence of a certain
physical entity composing material objects, it is seen as being within its rights.
Physics tells us what material bodies exist in the universe and what their
composition is. Modal realism asserts the existence of physical objects (since
at least some possible worlds are such), yet is unable to provide a physical
argument for that. Thus its credibility is low. The modal realist can only reply
by arguing that modal semantics has no say on the existence of actual objects,
yet is within its rights in judging the existence of merely possible objects.
The response does not work for the reason already mentioned: by the modal
realist’s lights, mere possibility is a matter of spatiotemporal isolation. How
come, then, that a theory can establish the existence of isolated universes,
but not the existence of any object within our universe? This seems entirely
arbitrary. The pragmatic objection is a powerful one given the weight of
pragmatic considerations in Lewis (1986). But I think it does not manage to
undercut modal realism completely. Calculating the costs and benefits of a
10Though it is of course revolting for a nominalist. The latter may well argue that mathematical
practice does pose a genuine problem to be resolved through work on mathematical ontology. See
Bueno and Shalkowski (2000).
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particular theory is a tricky business. We must have a more straightforward
objection.
4
The arguments of the previous sections have a shared theme. They pinpoint
the reductive analysis of modality as the modal realist’s soft underbelly. The
modal realist’s commitment to the reduction prevents him from giving con-
vincing responses to both objections. I suggest we continue aiming at the same
spot.
Accepting the reduction of modality should invite generally two kinds of
worries: that the reduction is too restrictive with regard to what it stipulates
as possible, and that it is too permissive. To the worries of the former kind
belongs the notorious question of whether there could be nothing, rather
than something. We envisage a possibility of nothing, yet such a possibility
is to be realised at some universe, where at least that very universe, its
spacetime, exists. Similarly, according to modal realism, there is no non-
spatiotemporal possible world. It is not clear why any thing must of necessity be
spatiotemporal—or at least temporal, as in the special case of spirits admitted
to the modal-realist ontology. We must then be able to rule out a possibility of a
non-spatiotemporal entity. In fact, modal realism accepts non-spatiotemporal
entities, such as numbers. Those exist at every world. The question, however,
may be whether there are contingent non-spatiotemporal entities. Suppose
there are, and take one such entity X. Then the contingency of X is explained
by saying that X exists at a world w and does not exist at u = w. Its existence
at w is explained by its spatiotemporal inclusion in the spacetime of w, and
analogously its non-existence at u is explained by its exclusion from the
spacetime of u. But since X is not included in any spacetime by assumption,
the explanation of its contingency fails.
The modal realist, I suspect, would treat the above argument as a reductio
ad absurdum. On what right, he will ask, do we judge X’s existence contingent
in the first place? For that we need a world where X exists and a world where
it does not. But there is no spatiotemporal world where a non-spatiotemporal
X exists. Therefore, X exists necessarily. Though I am not sure how to assess
this response, still the onus of proof is on the objector. He should exhibit a
particular non-spatiotemporal X in order for us to take his objection seriously.
Modal realism might not explain why contingency and spatiotemporality are
necessarily linked together, but that by itself does not put the link in doubt.
The problem of analogous spatiotemporal relations falls in the second class
of worries, that modal realism is too permissive.11 Here the problem is in
describing alternative worlds with a fixed vocabulary. Lewis puts it thus. Let
the world Wr be endowed with relativistic spacetime, and the world Wn =
11See Lewis (1986:74–76).
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Wr with Newtonian space and time. Say that a world w is spatiotemporally
interrelated if all of its entities are mutually so related. Then the modal realist
in Wr may claim that Wr is spatiotemporally interrelated and that Wn is
also spatiotemporally interrelated. Now, when he calls Wn ‘spatiotemporally
interrelated’, does he mean that it is so in the relativistic sense, or in the
Newtonian sense? No problem arises in the former case. Although any two
points in Wr are connected by one spatiotemporal relation, any two points in
Wn of Newtonian space and time are connected by two relations, spatial and
temporal. Therefore, the modal realist in Wr can legitimately assert that Wn is
spatiotemporally interrelated. Yet, if he wishes to assert that the inhabitants of
Wn are connected by Newtonian spatial and temporal relations, he cannot do
so. The names for spatiotemporal relations are drawn by him from a relativistic
vocabulary, that is, from the vocabulary of the spacetime theory of his own
world. He must say instead that the points of Wn are connected by certain
relations, and the task is to say what those relations are.
The problem, in other words, is that the modal-realist theory calls for the
inhabitants of each possible world to be connected by the spatiotemporal
relations R1, R2, . . .. But the modal realist is by necessity located in some world
w. The worlds other than w may have a spatiotemporal structure different from
w, so that the modal realist of w will have no right to claim the ‘spatiotemporal’
relatedness of other worlds. There will be, in general, no world-independent
univocal specification of the relations R1, R2, . . ..
Lewis’ simple solution lies in introducing ‘analogical relations’ that would
play the role of spatiotemporal relations. Whereas they are not real spa-
tiotemporal relations, they will be analogous to them in four respects: in being
natural, pervasive, discriminating, and external.12 He admits the idea to be a
‘messy’ one, and he further proposes to connect the inhabitants of each world
by external relations of whatever kind.
As Lewis himself concedes, the issue of analogical relations is a difficult one.
It might force a modification of modal realism. If the modal realist in Wr is to
be denied the right to call the world Wn spatiotemporally interrelated, how can
he believe Wn to be a spatiotemporal universe in the first place? Conversely,
if the modal realist of Wr is granted the right to call Wn a ‘spatiotemporal
universe’, the whole problem is dissolved. Since there are different mutually
inconsistent spacetime theories, he can say that Wn is governed by one such
theory, Tn (i.e. a Newtonian theory), and that it is interrelated by whatever
spatiotemporal relations admissible within Tn. And if our modal realist cannot
legitimately describe Wn as spatiotemporally interrelated, he cannot legiti-
mately claim Wn to be a spatiotemporal universe. He will at most be able to say
that it is analogically spatiotemporal.
12See Lewis (1986:76).
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5
Is there a further problem? So far we have dealt only with one-half, so to
speak, of the notion of Lewisean possible worlds. Each such world must
be spatiotemporally interrelated. But, secondly, it must be spatiotemporally
isolated from any other world. We can spell this out by saying that there is no
spatiotemporal relation R˜ that connects two entities in distinct possible worlds.
In the language of Lewis’ counterpart theory we will have:
∀x∀y∀w∀u(Ixw ∧ Iyu ∧ R˜xy ⊃ w = u), (3)
where I is the primitive relation of inclusion (later interpreted by Lewis as a
mereological relation). The condition (3) represents a fundamental claim of
modal realism. The sceptic has two ways of opposing it, the obtuse way and
the constructive way. Obtuse objections will simply point out explanatory and
other deficiencies without suggesting any incoherence, let alone any recipe
for moving forward. Replies to these uninformative objections are similarly
uninformative. A sample exchange could take the following form.
Obtuse objection. There is no explication of what it takes two worlds to be
spatiotemporally isolated, or at any rate, what it takes the inhabitants of two
distinct worlds to be so.
Reply. The modal realist is not obliged to explicate isolation. He simply
denies that there is any spatiotemporal relation between the inhabitants of two
distinct worlds. It is, therefore, sufficient that spatiotemporal connection is well
understood.
Obtuse objection. There is no explanation why reality must consist of spa-
tiotemporally disconnected universes, that is, why R˜ab is false unless a and
b are worldmates.
Reply. The explanation desired by the objector must be couched in causal
terms. There clearly can be no such explanation appropriate here.
Obtuse objection. There is no theory of what kind of geometry is imposed on
the reality consisting of a myriad of different spacetime structures. Does this
reality have any geometrical structure?
Reply. The only meaningful debate is the debate about the geometrical
structure of a single possible world. There is no point in debating the geometry
of logical space.
Obtuse objection. Modal realism uncritically commits us to the genuineness
of spatiotemporal relations (or perhaps only temporal relations). But if rela-
tionalism is true, these may well be fictions, at least in some worlds.
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Reply. Where spatiotemporal relations are not genuine, a suitable paraphrase
will be found.
Another reply. Relationalism is false. If it is false, then it is necessarily false.
So, since it is false in our world, it is false in every other world.
For all of its shortcomings the obtuse way has its value. It advances beyond
the bare scepticism of the ‘incredulous stare’. It is the latter unreflective kind of
scepticism which is responsible for the widespread rejection of modal realism,
both among metaphysicians and other philosophers. And more interestingly,
it takes the reduction of modal notions with utmost seriousness. If possible
worlds are just spatiotemporal universes, the modal realist must tell a story
about spacetime. Taking the clue from the obtuse objector, we may now follow
up with a constructive criticism.
The question I want to ask here is to what extent the notion of spatiotem-
poral isolation is well understood. It is odd how little attention was paid to
this issue.13 The challenge usually comes from the opposite direction: one
must be able to distinguish actual isolated universes—i.e., those described by
the physical theory—from merely possible worlds. But the issue is far from
trivial. Any object, however remote, is routinely conceived as being located at
a certain spatial distance from us. That is why we think of it as remote in the
first place. The same goes for the temporal dimension: we normally think of
every event being in our past or in our future. We can at least register a certain
surprise at the uncritical acceptance of disconnectedness.
How to make sense of it? Two strategies are available. On the first strategy,
we are tasked with establishing the plausibility of disconnectedness. Such is
the objective of King (1995) and Quinton (1962). These authors come up
with complicated hypothetical scenarios that appear to be best explained by
postulating disconnected spaces or disconnected times. The very notion of
disconnectedness is, however, left uninterpreted. But so far as the modal
reduction rests upon it, the notion cannot be treated as a primitive. The first
strategy leaves, therefore, a vital lacuna.
Under the second strategy, the purpose is precisely in explicating discon-
nectedness. If the question is considered purely algebraically, the answer,
though not trivial, is uninformative. We could say that the space X is a
collection of points between which we can fix a path. For any two points
x, y ∈ X it will be determined by a continuous function f : [0; 1] → X, where
f (0) = x and f (1) = y. Now, if there is a point u for which no f exists such that
f (x) = 0 and f (u) = 1, then x and u are disconnected. And since x is connected
to every other point in X, we can say that u is disconnected from X. That
is all one can say: disconnectedness is obscure here, because it is postulated.
No explanation is offered as to why no path is found between u and x. To
13A notable exception is Rosenberg (1989).
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improve our understanding, we can then provide a geometrical interpretation
of the notion. For example, we can take two parallel Euclidean planes A and
B. Let the points x and y lie in the plane A. Then each of them can be reached
from the other by drawing a line (not necessarily a straight one) itself lying
in that plane. That line represents the continuous path between the points of
the plane. Let the point u lie in B. Then there is no line in the plane A that
connects u with either x or y.
Such is the pattern of the geometrical explication of disconnectedness.
A moment of reflection shows that not much is gained by it. We have an
illustration of the algebraic notion, but we are still missing the reason why
u is inaccessible to x or y. And in any event, this kind of explication does
not deliver the notion demanded by the modal realist. Since his possible
worlds are physical spacetimes, we must search for a physical interpretation of
disconnectedness.
General relativity (or GTR) might seem to offer help. It contributes two
central insights to the debate. One of them is that the geometry of the
world is dependent on its gravitational forces. In the presence of these forces
spacetime is curved. The degree, and the sign, of the curvature affects the
metric of spacetime. But the gravitational forces themselves result from a
particular distribution of matter. So, in contrast to the intuitive conception,
spacetime is no longer permanent and static, but is intimately linked to matter.
One could, therefore, draw the conclusion that where there is no matter,
understood broadly to include electromagnetic and gravitational fields, there
is no spacetime either.
The second insight is altogether more controversial. The dominant cosmo-
logical solution of Einstein’s field equations envisages the expanding spacetime
springing into being a certain number of years ago. No longer should we
postulate static space and static time, infinite and all-encompassing. Time is
finite, and space is finite. If so, there is no conceptual obstacle to think about
other spaces and other times. More accurately, we should speak of other
spacetimes, so far as our own space and time are represented in GTR by a four-
dimensional manifold. And therefore, the conceptual underpinning of modal
realism appears to be endorsed by the best available physical theory.
However, such perception would be mistaken. GTR passes no judgement
on the possibility of isolated spacetimes. Its primary concern is with the local
geometry of spacetime. It is charged with describing the influence of matter
on the geometrical features of the world. As far as GTR is concerned, what
happens at infinity, far away from matter, is given to negotiation. It may be
that spacetime flattens out there, and the curvature becomes zero. Or it may
be that the world has a natural curvature, and its geometry is either hyperbolic
or elliptic. The second option itself splits in two. It may be that the global
curvature of the spacetime is its fundamental property, not subject to any
kind of further causal explanation. Or it may be that it is caused by chunks
of matter acting on the universe from the fifth dimension. We will then have
a situation analogous to Poincaré’s thought-experiment of a heated sphere:
whereas inhabitants of our universe see the whole of spacetime as curved, to
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the observer outside the universe its curvature is caused by the behaviour of
matter.
The complaint voiced so far has been factual. As a matter of fact, we
say, there is no readily available interpretation of disconnectedness. Now the
question is, could there be such an interpretation in principle? Suppose we
equip modal realism with a theory T which provides us with the desired
interpretation of disconnectedness. What would be the status of T itself? It
could not be a purely mathematical theory, so far as possible worlds are not
mathematical abstractions, but physical space-times. So, per above, it is a
physical theory. But if it is a physical theory, then at least that part of it which
deals with disconnectedness is not necessary, but contingent: disconnectedness
is treated as a physical phenomenon. With interpretation will come an attempt
of explanation. The theory T will have to say why two worlds are disconnected.
But so far as T is a physical theory, the ‘reason’ two worlds are disconnected
will be contingent.
Plainly that would be an unacceptable result for the modal realist. I do
not know what he can say in response to the lack of explication. But he may
still fasten on our ambition to explain. We were wrong, he might claim, in
demanding a physical explanation of disconnectedness. Any such explanation
should be available for intra-world phenomena, for the events occurring within
one world. The objector here demands an explanation for cross-world phe-
nomena. And no explanation of that kind can be given—for several reasons.
For example, in giving a physical explanation of disconnectedness we should
say how and under what conditions possible worlds are disconnected, and in
saying so we will have to name causal factors. This is absurd: there are no
causal relations between worlds. Such a defence is defective. To accept it
means to return to square one: we in effect declare that no explanation of
disconnectedness is possible. This is to ignore the fact that Lewisean worlds,
or at least some of them, are physical entities. They are spacetimes governed
by physical laws, however alien they are to the actual physical laws. It is hard
to see why the relation between them, or the lack thereof, cannot be given a
physical account. The modal realist creates a mystery precisely where we are
not prepared to grant it.
6
If the argument of Section 5 is correct, then modal realism fails on pragmatic
grounds. In a successful reduction, we reduce obscure notions to the notions
that are understood better, presumably much better. There is little value in
an obscurity replaced by another obscurity. Let me now present a different
sort of problem created by Lewis’s reduction. We begin with the case of actual
disconnected universes. It has been explored extensively in the literature. Let
us suppose that there are isolated spacetimes within one possible world. Modal
realism cannot accept that. Any two isolated spacetimes cannot be parts of the
same world. They are themselves two distinct possible worlds.
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However, things actually are in our world, cannot we, on the other hand,
entertain a possibility of two isolated spacetimes within one world? The
modal realist’s answer is that we cannot. Lewis lists four alternatives to such
isolated spacetimes.14 All of them come down to the same idea that actual
space, actual time, or actual spacetime are bigger than you might think. The
allegedly isolated spacetimes must be embedded in all-encompassing space,
or all-encompassing time, or all-encompassing spacetime. The simplest case is
that of a higher-dimensional space, where the isolated parts are stacked like
flatlands in a three-dimensional space.
Now it might be unclear what kind of possibility is at stake here. If the
possibility of actual isolated spacetimes (or spaces and times) is the product
of a thought experiment à la Quinton and King, then Lewis’ rejoinder is well
taken. There is hardly any way for the imaginer to eliminate, for instance, a
higher-dimensional spacetime enveloping the lower-dimensional parts. There
is some textual evidence that Lewis addresses precisely this kind of possibility:
If you thought, as I did too, that a single world might consist of many more
or less isolated world-like parts, how sure can you be that you really had
in mind the supposed possibility that I reject? Are you sure that it was
an essential part of your thought that the world-like parts were in no way
spatiotemporally related? Or might you not have had in mind, rather, one
of these substitutes I offer? Lewis (1986:72–73)
Secondly, the possibility concerned may also be interpreted as a physical
one, in the sense that such a possibility is asserted by a physical theory.
Indeed, it has become a frequent topic in the past 40 years in the discussions
in quantum mechanics. Here, Lewis gains support from unexpected quarters.
As John Earman observed long ago, it is hard to see how isolated spacetimes
can become a subject of a physical theory, so far as no causal interaction
is permitted between them. Since there is no empirical evidence about a
separate spacetime to feed to the theory, its existence should remain entirely
speculative.15
Earman, however, does not doubt the logical or physical possibility of
isolated spacetimes. For all we know, there may be such isolated spacetimes
within our universe. But since their existence cannot in principle be subjected
to verification, it cannot be a proper part of a physical theory. If we agree on
that much, it seems unavoidable that there is a possible world containing more
than one spacetime. And if there is such a world, then there is a possible world
at which two worlds are actual. It would be easy to trivialise this problem by
using the indexical notion of actuality. According to modal realism, actuality
comprises me and my surroundings. Since my surroundings are related to
me spatiotemporally, the claims about actual spatiotemporally disconnected
(spatiotemporal) objects will be incoherent. The reason why Lewis does not
14See Lewis (1986:71–73).
15See Earman (1970:267).
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make such a move is that it would reverse the order of explanation. The modal
realist notion of actuality must fall off the correct notion of a possible world,
not the other way around. So, rather than invoking his analysis of actuality,
Lewis rolls out his four surrogates of isolated spacetimes mentioned earlier.
But there is more mystery here than he allows. Since, according to the modal
realist, under no circumstances a possible world can contain more than one
spacetime, then, in effect, there must be, according to him, some kind of a
rule preventing the emergence of several actual spacetimes. It is one thing to
reject such spacetimes in our universe for the lack of evidence, or to deny
the empirical import of their existence. It is a different matter to deny their
possibility altogether.
We have now a glimpse of a general problem. Modal realism assumes certain
rules governing the behaviour of isolated spacetimes. One such rule is that no
more than one spacetime can be actual. Another rule could be put as follows.
Let us suppose that there is a multitude of isolated spacetimes. Granted modal
realism, they qualify as possible worlds. Let us consider two such universes
and further assume for simplicity that they both have the topology of two-
dimensional cylinders. Suppose also that these two universes expand. Our
naive geometrical understanding tells us that they may eventually collide
one with another. Isolated spacetimes may become connected. The physics
of their encounter cannot be described by GTR. Some advances were made
in quantum cosmology where simplified models were developed for similar
scenarios.16
We have, therefore, the following argument:
1. The observed spacetime may collide with another isolated spacetime.
2. I and all my surroundings may collide with another isolated spacetime.
3. The actual world may collide with another isolated spacetime.
4. The actual world may collide with another possible world.
The first step of the inference is an assumption putatively based on a physical
theory. Each subsequent step follows from the preceding one by a paraphrase.
The modal realist is sure to attack claim #1. The observed spacetime may
collide with another actual spacetime. Though actual spacetimes may collide,
merely possible spacetimes cannot. But the protest is ineffective. The only
way to distinguish between actual and merely possible spacetimes at this
stage is to invoke primitive modality. Mathematical and physical complications
notwithstanding, what we can claim is the following: modal realism imposes
restrictions on the dynamic evolution of isolated spacetimes. Given a coherent
possibility of interaction between isolated spacetimes, there must be a factor—
a necessary one—preventing it. What this factor could be remains obscure.
Moreover, even if we determine such a factor, I think it is clear that it will be
of physical nature, having the form of a physical law. If so, it will be found that
the structure of logical space is governed by physics.
16See Strominger (1991). See also Rucker (1984) for a different approach.
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To sum up, the problem of uniqueness and the problem of collision can be
viewed as illustrations of a more general problem of regulation. In pursuing
the reduction of modal notions, the modal realist assimilates possible worlds
to isolated spatiotemporal universes. He is then forced to regulate their
behaviour with arbitrary rules. The purpose of such regulation is in satisfying
our modal intuitions, such as the S5-driven intuition that everything that is
possible is necessarily so. In the end, rather than obtaining explanatory unity
and clarity, we are left with stipulations that add more mystery to modal reality
that it deserves.17
7
I want to conclude by commenting briefly on two upgrades of modal realism
that might be deemed effective in addressing the problem of regulation. One
such upgrade, meant to deal specifically with actual isolated universes, was pro-
posed by Phillip Bricker.18 To recognise actual isolated universes as a genuine
possibility we must change the notion of isolation between possible worlds. We
say that two universes are isolated just in case there is no natural external rela-
tion between them. Spatiotemporal relations fall into just one class of external
relations. Other external relations are needed to distinguish between the iso-
lation of actual spatiotemporally disconnected universes and the isolation of
possible worlds. The former are still connected by other external relations,
while the latter are not connected by any external relations whatsoever.
This could, I think, be a neat solution of the difficulty. The plurality of possi-
ble worlds will no longer have to be regulated, since its elements will not stand
in any relation whatsoever. So, for example, the scenario of collision will no
longer be relevant, since any such scenario would apply to spacetime systems
whose elements stand in some external relation to each other. But the solution
assumes that actual disconnected spacetimes stand in an external relation
to each other. Therefore, it may only work once we have exhibited these ex-
ternal relations. Bricker does not seem to have achieved that. Further, the
benefit of using only spatiotemporal relations in Lewis’ reduction is that
they are supposed to be understood better than modal notions. Therefore,
any other relations featuring in the metaphysics of modal realism must be
17An alternative way of putting essentially the same idea could be this. According to modal
realism, there are Newtonian worlds and there are relativistic worlds. Thus consider two possible
worlds Wn and W′n containing a three-dimensional Newtonian space E3 and a one-dimensional
Newtonian time R, and a possible world Wr containing a relativistic spacetime like S3 × R. We
must first explain how there can be more than one Newtonian world, since this presumably will
mean amending several key elements of Newtonian physics, such as the postulate of absolute
simultaneity. After we are done with that, we will have to explain how all three worlds are isolated.
But whatever form our theory of isolation will take, there is simply no reason to expect that
isolation be physically invariant: the isolation of Wn and W′n will have to be explained differently
from the isolation of Wn and Wr .
18See Bricker (2001).
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already understood well. For this reason, spatiotemporal relations are good
candidates. They feature both in scientific theories and in everyday discourse.
Other external relations, however, do not have the same advantage. Although
Bricker’s version of modal realism might not be worse off than its original
version, it does not, I think, get us any further.
The second modification of modal realism addresses the problem of con-
tingent claims about the plurality of worlds. The idea is that claims about
the plurality must be accorded special treatment. John Divers has suggested
the following ‘extraordinary modal principles’ to be invoked whenever the
statement A is a claim about the plurality of Lewisean universes (or about
sets and properties, among other things):19
It is possible that A iff A. (A)
It is necessary that A iff A. (AN)
It is contingent that A iff A and not-A. (AC)
The explanation by extraordinary modal principles works as follows. Consider
a plainly contingent non-extraordinary statement, such as ‘Obama is married’.
Its contingency is explained in terms of the existence of two distinct Lewisean
universes: one in which Obama is married, and one in which Obama is a
bachelor. We have then established the truth of an extraordinary statement
A, such as ‘There are two Lewisean universes’. By the clause (AN) we have
that A is necessarily true. It will now follow, in a system as weak as T, that A
is not contingently true. A similar routine is activated for other extraordinary
statements.
Therefore, the truth simpliciter of extraordinary statements is established
by a modal-realist reasoning. No further question of the modal status of
extraordinary statements should arise: the clauses (A) and (AN) ensure that
modal operators can be deleted at will from any such statement. That is to say,
in the case of extraordinary statements, the notions of truth, possible truth, and
necessary truth are made to coincide.
The significance of Divers’ amendment for our discussion is that any rules
regulating the plurality of possible worlds will be declared necessary, just as the
modal realist requires. But the question is: should modal realism be established
first, and then the extraordinary principles are brought up to merely illustrate
the way it deals with the claims about plurality, or are the extraordinary
principles established independently and then used to justify modal realism
(namely, the modal status of the claims about plurality)? If the principles are
accorded with the former illustrative role, Divers should be understood as
making explicit the modal realist treatment of plurality claims. As I will explain
in a moment, there is nothing wrong with this goal. Yet we are interested here
in the justificatory role of the principles. We want to see whether they can be
19See Divers (2002:47–9).
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used, for example, to block the problem of regulation and thus vindicate, on
independent grounds, one of the central tenets of modal realism.
It is not immediately clear from the text of Divers (2002) what reading the
principles should be given. I can think of two ways of interpreting them. On
the first interpretation, these principles are meant to be extensionally correct.
They are to be read as material bi-conditionals. Then we must regard all
extraordinary statements as being either necessarily true or necessarily false.
For we observe that the clauses (A)–(AC) hold for any necessary truth and
necessary falsehood, such as ‘It is raining or it is not raining’ or ‘It is raining
and it is not raining’. There is little we can say against the principles in this case.
Of course, as noted already, if A is necessarily true, then it is true and possibly
true, and if it is necessarily false, then it is false and possibly false. Though
the principles will hold, clearly they cannot defend modal realism. They are
themselves based on the modal realist assumption that statements about the
plurality of worlds—consequently, about the plurality of isolated universes—
are all necessarily true or necessarily false. And the unsolved question is the
legitimacy of that very assumption. So if we read (A)–(AC) extensionally, they
can tell us at most how modal realism is supposed to treat claims about the
plurality. Their role will be merely illustrative.
On the second reading, the three principles elucidate the cognitive content
of modal claims about plurality. To wit, claims about plurality admit no
modal content. Our dropping of modal operators is not only extensionally
adequate, but also reflects the correct conceptual analysis of such statements.
This interpretation should immediately be qualified, since on the modal realist
account there is no genuine modal content in any assertion. All there is is
the content about Lewisean universes. But even if such a reductionism is
granted, it is generally not part of the modal realist view that modal locutions
do not contribute to the truth-value of the statement where they occur. They
of course do contribute, for this is the reason why the modal realist interprets,
for example, ‘Obama is divorced’ and ‘Possibly, Obama is divorced’ in two
different ways. The extraordinary interpretation, on the other hand, holds the
modal ingredient of the extraordinary statements as semantically idle: it con-
tributes at most to their pragmatic force, not their semantic content. That is, we
are simply unable to make a substantial modal claim about Lewisean universes
(and about sets and properties too, for that matter). This interpretation seems
more plausible, since the introduction of the three principles is prompted by
an ambiguity of their representation in the counterpart theory.20
Now I think that one could convincingly impose special constraints on claims
about entities having a special role in our modal thinking. We engage in modal
talk about objects of our experience taken in the widest sense, from ordinary
middle-sized objects all the way to theoretical constructions of modern physics.
We can also reason about properties of the universe as a whole, thus making
modal claims about it. But what if we wanted to reason about God? What if we
20See Divers (2002:307).
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asked whether God necessarily acts in good will or whether He is necessarily
active? Our apparatus of possible worlds that worked fine for objects of
experience might not be adapted for reasoning about God. There we would
reach limits of intelligibility.21 So the principles can potentially be used in
defending a doctrine that refuses to make counterfactual claims about God.
In the same way, if we were to reason about sets, the principles might seem
plausible too. The content of the claim ‘The set of all reals is uncountable’ may
well be identical to the content of the claim ‘Necessarily, the set of all reals
is uncountable’. Someone who thinks properly about mathematical objects
should not distinguish between how they are and how they could be.
But the trouble is that modal realism assimilates (at least some) possible
worlds to physical entities. If we are able to think about spatiotemporally
connected galaxies counterfactually, why cannot we do the same with huge
isolated collections of such galaxies? Certainly we are allowed to use coun-
terfactuals with collections of galaxies that are spatiotemporally connected. It
is puzzling why spatiotemporal isolation should suddenly make such reason-
ing semantically idle. Therefore, I think, whereas Divers’ constraints appear
innocuous and rather plausible when imposed on statements about God, sets,
and perhaps some other abstract objects, they would seem entirely ad hoc with
Lewis’ worlds. And so, again, the principles cannot be invoked to justify modal
realism on independent grounds.
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